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MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY2 
Exploring social theory 
Social theorists speculate about large-scale social questions. A key focus is to ask of any 
phenomenon, how is it possible? The phenomena to which this question may be addressed 
include not only those phenomena that we may encounter in everyday life and practice, 
such as organizations and management; they also include explanation of these as a 
phenomenon. In this sense, what social theory addresses is how any social order or 
practices of ordering are possible. These practices thus include those constructing and those 
and that which are constructed through these processes. For example, social theory is 
concerned with how prior theories of the social, in their explanations of important 
questions, such as the nature of power and social structure, gender and ethnicity, 
modernity and postmodernity, civilizations and their discontents, have been formulated in 
the past and require contemporary reformulating in analytic terms for present knowledges 
and times. Contemporary social theory laces through all the concerns of contemporary 
management and organization theory: it offers not so much theory for management or 
theory for organizations but theory that is addressed not only to the social practices that 
constitute these theories but that also has implications for what these theories take for 
granted.   
Management and organization theory are relatively recent areas of evolution in the social 
sciences; indeed, for the most part they evolved from earlier periods of embeddedness in 
broader social science areas such as sociology, history, economics or engineering. The 
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founders of these areas were people such as Adam Smith (1950; lived 1723-1790), a political 
economist and moral philosopher; Karl Marx (1976; lived 1818-1883), also a political 
economist as well as a philosopher; Max Weber (1978; lived 1864-1920), a legal scholar, 
economic historian and latterly a sociologist; Frederick Taylor (1911; lived 1856 -1915), not a 
scholar but a self-taught engineer.   
As the fields of management and organization theory have subsequently developed these 
disciplinary areas have become ever more specialized and those founders of the fields have 
largely faded from memory. Nonetheless, the big picture and large-scale theorizing that 
some of these figures engaged in (Taylor hardly counts in this calculus) has not faded away; 
there are many contemporary figures who approach larger questions of social, political, 
cultural and economic life, the power of whose thought has influenced broader theorizing 
about more specialized areas, including management and organization theory. Broadly 
speaking, those figures are recognized as social theorists because they have developed 
narrative and analytical frameworks that critically examine social phenomena. To say they 
do so ‘critically’ is the key: what they do not do is take for granted either how the field of 
knowledge has been constructed before them or accept the commons sense definitions of 
those phenomena that they are interested in.  
What qualified a scholar to be considered a social theorist? Essentially, they are figures 
whose influence extends well beyond their home disciplines into the public sphere, 
combining the role of social theorist with that of being a public intellectual, someone that 
the educated non-specialist might come across, people whose ideas about the way that 
aspects of the world work have made a broad critical conceptual impact on that world: they 
make a difference as to how we see and think about our world. Making a difference is what 
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great teachers do and we may say that the figures we have selected are all, through their 
books (and it is largely through books), figures who have made a significant difference to the 
way many others and we see the world. In this respect, they are heirs to the traditions that 
figures such as Marx, Smith or Weber initiated.  
Let us consider Weber for a moment because he is an illustrative case of what makes a 
social theorist a social theorist. In management and organization theory, if he is 
remembered at all, it will most often be as classical theorist, concerned with bureaucracy. 
While this is not false it is hardly adequate: Weber was a major intellectual figure in debates 
about methodology, the origins of capitalism, the comparative study of major world 
religions, the ethics of vocation, economic history, the conditions of industrial workers, 
public administration and much else besides. What most management and organization 
theory know of him is very little. Consequently, what most students in these areas learn is 
even less. We may take from this founding example of Max Weber that social theorists are 
wide-ranging in their concerns; concerned with major intellectual debates that have 
contemporary relevance; concerned with delineating elaborated and coherent theory about 
the matters that debate encompasses and that they do so in such a way that they offer 
potential guidance to many substantive fields of knowledge. 
Management and organization studies constitute a flow of knowledge fed by many streams, 
not all of them deemed social theory but nonetheless significant. Cybernetics, for instance, 
especially the contributions of Herbert Simon (1996; 2013) (a scholar awarded the Sveriges 
Riksbank prize in honor of Alfred Nobel) has played an important role. It is appropriate to 
state that the reason for the exclusion of Simon and (and of other important intellectual 
figures who greatly contributed to the development of organization theory, such as Gregory 
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Bateson, [2000]) is not due idiosyncratic preferences but rather to the decision to focus on 
social theory informed contributions. 
Social theory, as distinct from management or organization theory, is a continent of 
possibilities composed of many fields, with distinct but different topographical features. 
Social theory is concerned with the continent, with the overarching embeddedness of the 
distinct topographies of the different regions, or disciplinary areas. The effects of 
considerable evolution, erosion and accretion will have shaped some aspects of these 
disciplinary areas; other areas may be more recent, less sedimented, still being shaped. 
Social theory has been a major factor in the shaping, forming and evolving of these more 
recent substantive disciplinary areas, such as management and organization studies. The 
role of social theory produces very different inflections. Consider the ranking of Weber and 
Foucault, for instance.3 Comparing leading European production of disciplinary knowledge 
in the journal Organization Studies with that of the American journal Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Üsdiken and Pasadeos (1995) demonstrated that while Weber and Foucault 
loomed large in citations in the European consciousness, Foucault did not receive citation 
and Weber barely registered in America in the top 100 citations.4 The findings in this work 
are updated in Üsdiken (2014), which finds that differences between North American and 
European scholarship are still evident, looking at a broader range of journals and a longer 
period of time. Üsdiken (2010), in a related article, notes that perhaps as a result of national 
education systems’ evaluation exercises that tend to privilege US-based journals, ‘wholesale 
adoption of US-based theories and research practices has also been expanding’ (Üsdiken, 
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2010, p. 732). At the earlier stage there was a big difference but now American work is 
increasingly prevailing, re-framing European work through a combination of demographic 
density and intellectual hegemony through overwhelming command of the circuits of power 
– editorial and review functions in the key journals – that define legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
discernible differences remain. For the future, one should not think that building only on 
European intellectual traditions is the best way. Similar advances could (and should) be 
achieved by building also on other philosophical and social traditions developed outside of 
Europe, for instance from Chinese scholarship (Fei, 1939) or from the critical pedagogy of 
Brazilian Paulo Freire (2018) or from indigenous perspectives such as Mbigi (2005; see 
Seremani & Clegg, 2015, on epistemological third spaces). 
The disciplines, by convention, are textually composed networks: who gets cited where, 
when, how often, defines the disciplinary field. One of the things that social theory can do is 
to address how the texts of disciplinary scholarship and more everyday practices have been 
formed, shaped and used. Any such engagement is inherently critical in its questioning of 
existing institutions constituting the management and the organization of our selves and 
those things with which we live and work, the norms and practices established, their 
constitution of and by power and other disciplinary practices, such as writing, culture, 
politics, selfhood and technology. 
The focus on social theories is not to deny the existence or significance of more organization 
or management-oriented writers such as those who regularly appear in the pages of the 
leading journals in these fields. Such figures are clearly significant. However, their 
significance remains largely specific to the management and organizations field: Karl Weick 
(1995) or Katherine Eisenhardt (1989), for instance, are clearly major figures in management 
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and organizations but they are of less influence in terms of the development of broader 
social theories. While these figures are important they are not the focus here.  
Our cast of characters have had a more transcendental impact, including on the practices of 
the management and organization disciplines, yet they will rarely be encountered in the 
undergraduate curriculum.  The more advanced curriculum, however, is another matter: 
here the concerns, at best, are less with techniques and their application and more with 
what these techniques and applications do as practices. To ask these questions is to, 
necessarily, engage with social theory and in so doing, the student is engaging in a 
conversation that is much broader and potentially richer than those that may have been 
previously encountered. Such conversations are not easy at first; one is entering into the 
domains of scholarship that are well established, legitimate but contested, broad reaching 
and widely engaged. The question is where to begin: this book provides answers.  
There is a considerable gap between what is typically taught in undergraduate business 
subjects and what is expected from research students. While the former courses are 
oriented towards producing technically competent managers, accountants, etc., the latter is 
more concerned to contribute original knowledge to the disciplinary corpus. An obstacle in 
this respect is the absence of a bridging text that covers aspects of contemporary social 
theory relevant to the world of business and organizations. Without grounding in social 
theory, research students are unlikely to gain the knowledge, skills and sophistication that 
will see them publish in the top tier journals.  The intent of this book is to help students and 
their teachers in bridging this gap. 
The cast of characters 
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As we have said, social theory is a rich and encyclopaedic domain. One must need to be 
selective. What guided the selectivity in this instance? The personal knowledge, particular 
enthusiasms and social networks of the editors framed a large part of it. We all have our 
favourites and those theorists that are represented here are some personal favourites, 
drawn from the stocks of knowledge that we use and deploy. Obviously, our knowledge is a 
form of ‘bounded rationality’; it is framed by preferences, habits and theoretical 
orientations. We make no apologies for having these and being candid about them, for it is 
impossible to be exhaustive. No one can claim perfect knowledge or disinterest; hence our 
interests and our bounded knowledge frames the choices made. We had one implicit rule in 
making our choices, which was that the social theorists chosen should be ones with a 
relatively contemporary relevance and output.  In practice, this means that they should 
have been writing in the period from the contemporary flowering of social theory from the 
1960s to the present day. 
The first chapter, written by Andrea Whittle and Frank Mueller, on ‘Ethnomethodology’, 
explores the influence of Harold Garfinkel and the approach to studying social action known 
as ethnomethodology. The chapter explores the distinct approach to studying organizing ‘as 
it happens’ developed by ethnomethodologists. Ethnomethodology was regarded as a quite 
radical approach when it was first encountered in Garfinkel’s work because of its very 
evident difference from the dominant social theory of mainstream structural-functionalism. 
Its opposition to much embedded intellectual capital did not endear it those whose capital it 
was.  The dominant theory, with its stress on systems, their functional prerequisites and 
pattern variables, on the centrality of socialization and social order within the frame of a 
central value system, could not have been more antithetical to the social theory that 
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ethnomethodology established.  Where the former was top down and emphasised social 
order, the latter was very much a theory that worked from the intricacies of how order was 
established provisionally and capable of being easily breached in scenes drawn from 
everyday life: from decision-making by jurors, presentations of self in critical performances 
of transgender identity, scenes drawn from shopping, counselling and so on. Order, instead 
of being a monolith that is obeyed by the many and disobeyed by the few that are deviant, 
is instead something that is co-constructed on the basis of many tacit assumptions, cues and 
conventions.  
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology has been indirectly influential in an important strand of 
management and organization theory. Karl Weick’s (1995) approach to sensemaking, 
developed from his earlier concern with The social psychology of organizing (1969 edition, 
especially), clearly learnt a lot from ethnomethodology. Indeed, one of us on occasion, has 
been known to refer to the sensemaking literature as ethnomethodology translated into 
management. That translation was not the extent of the use to which ethnomethodology 
was put.  
Far from the Californian campuses where ethnomethodology first flourished its influence 
was felt in Europe, especially in the École Nationale Supérieure des Mines in Paris, where, as 
Damian O’Doherty writes in the chapter on ‘Actor-Network Theory: Michel Callon, Bruno 
Latour, John Law’, the three main protagonists of the approach, translated, in part, ideas 
from ethnomethodology into Actor-Network theory. Actor-Network theory (ANT) has 
become one of the most popular reference points across many regions of the social sciences 
and beyond. Moreover, it has become one of the most important approaches to 
management and organization, being ‘applied’ or extended by many well-known figures in 
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the field, such as John Hassard (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010; Law and Hassard, 1999), 
Barbara Czarniawska and Tor Hernes (2005). Elements of the ANT approach have also been 
cited as an influence and synthesised by other branches of social theory. As with 
ethnomethodology, ANT starts from the actors and their doings rather than seeing them as 
‘cultural dopes’ dominated by social systems that constrain them. One of the major 
innovations of ANT is to extend the notion of the actor, however. It is not only people that 
can exert social agency, that can act: actants, things that are non-human, such as 
technologies, as well as devices humble and smart and non-human beings such as scallops, 
also have agency in ANT. In a nutshell, ANT’s main contribution is to regard the ‘social’ as 
the partial and contingent outcome of specific actor-networks construction and 
understanding of the things of everyday practices. These practices are situated: they take 
place in field trips, in laboratories, in the accounts that scientists write of their practices 
(which does not always coincide with that these scientists are observed as doing by ANT 
observers) and they involve not only many other actors in networks of action but also 
actants. The test tube must be sterile; the acid pure, the vacuum chamber pristine for 
science to work. These humble material things are all actants. As it is in science so it is 
elsewhere: the lecturer depends on material actants such as computers, software such as 
PowerPoint, video projectors and seven simpler things such as electric cables and 
connections. The agency that emerges is a collective and relational phenomenon in which 
the properties of both actants and actors form assemblages that are responsible for what is 
done.   
Garfinkel’s ideas not only influenced 1970s Parisian intellectuals such as Bruno Latour and 
Michel Callon, as well as the Englishman who worked closely with them, John Law; they also 
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made headway in the hallowed halls of Cambridge, where a prolific social theorist, Anthony 
Giddens, had made a name for himself through numerous publications as the foremost 
interpreter of the sociological trinity of founding fathers, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile 
Durkheim (Giddens, 1973). Having done this, in 1976 he turned his imagination to 
establishing some New Rules of Sociological Method, in which a rich mix of philosophical 
and sociological resources were drawn on to produce what became known as structuration 
theory, a mix in which a little ethnomethodology was clearly discernible.  
New Rules of Sociological Method marked a shift in direction in Giddens’ preoccupations 
from classical to contemporary social theory. Ira Chatterjee, Jagat Kunwar and Frank den 
Hond, in their chapter on ‘Giddens and structuration theory’, discuss some of the major 
works that followed. What characterized these works was a concern with the duality of 
structure as a set of social relations and institutions framing social action by human agency. 
The concern with the duality of structure was not uppermost in either ethnomethodology or 
ANT, even though the relationship between individual action and social structure had long 
been a central topic in social theory. Anthony Giddens sought to reconcile the opposition 
between structure and agency which existed between the older focus of structural 
functionalism and the newer foci of approaches such as ethnomethodology and other 
approaches that were less inclined to constitute structure a priori.    
Giddens’ structuration theory regarded structure and agency as mutually constitutive, not 
as a dualism but as a duality. As a coin has two faces but is indubitably one thing so it was 
with social action, according to Giddens. Structure, in the form of institutions, rules and 
resources influences social action but the traffic is clearly not one way.  Human actors are 
capable of changing the social structures they inhabit; moreover, that they can do the things 
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they do is in part attributable to those structures they inhabit that enable certain kinds of 
action, as well as constraining other kinds of action. Structures are simultaneously always 
being (re)constituted through the actions that unfold. There is, in other words, a dynamic 
relationship between individual action and social structure that is played out empirically in 
what actors do. Giddens’ theory of structuration seeks to explain the motivations for 
actions, the choices—real and perceived—that are afforded as structural opportunities and 
constraints framing the interactions, doings and practices that unfold. 
Giddens’ theory of structuration is not the only contender in the arena of social theory that 
seeks to formulate the relationship between structure and agency. As Alistair Mutch 
discusses in the chapter on ‘Morphogenesis and reflexivity: Margaret Archer, critical realism 
and organizational analysis’, Margaret Archer also paid considerable attention to these 
relationships. In this work she provides a framework for examining relationships between 
agency and structure that are applicable to organizations. Archer draws on a specific 
philosophical approach known as critical realism. Roy Bhaskar (1975) and Harré and 
Madden (1975) first developed the ideas of critical realism.  Crucial to the position was that 
things in themselves have what Harré and Madden termed as causal powers, a position that 
Bhaskar named as transcendental realism. That science was possible, argued Bhaskar, was 
only because scientists could contrive experiments in which the real, manipulable nature of 
things could be actualized to produce particular outcomes. Under the appropriate standing 
conditions, designed in the laboratory, the causal powers inhering in things could be 
revealed, argued Harré and Madden. As a philosophy of science this is quite distinct from 
the more usual claim that science consists of observing the relationship between cause and 
effect in terms of events that are coterminous variables. Instead, it proposes that certain 
 15 
causal mechanism may inhere in the nature of things: for instance, iron will rust if exposed 
to the elements of air and water; causality may be genetic rather than eventful; it may be 
historical rather than coterminous. Whilst empiricism and positivism locate causal 
relationships at the level of coterminous events, critical realism locates them at the level of 
generative mechanisms rather than a coincident relation between dependent and 
independent variables. 
Critical realism prescribes social scientific method that seek to identify the generative 
mechanisms producing social events while recognizing that socially constructed structures 
are subject to more change than the phenomena of natural science. Human agency is 
enabled and constrained by social structures that they reproduce or transform. Social 
structures are designed and can be changed – a practice facilitated by the findings of social 
research. Archer terms this capability agential reflexivity. Drawing on critical realism Archer 
engages in significant dispute between critical realists and structuration theorists. The 
chapter explores the relationship between Archer’s work and the theory of institutional 
logics, to argue for the greater value of Archer’s less deterministic approach than that of the 
typical institutional logician.  
Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist, anthropologist, philosopher, and public intellectual, 
conducted his original fieldwork amongst the Berber of North Africa but became an acute 
observer of the society in which he resided, that of postwar France. Bourdieu brought an 
eye for ethnographic detail and an appreciation of the social constructions of a world of 
significations, stratifications and symbolism that great anthropologists respect.  As Mairi 
Maclean and Charles Harvey acknowledge in their chapter on ‘Pierre Bourdieu and Elites: 
Making the Hidden Visible’, Bourdieu was able to reveal and make manifest the hidden 
 16 
mechanisms of social stratification that often remain invisible in organizational and social 
life. The facility to do this was, perhaps, nowhere better displayed than in his book, 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Bourdieu, 1984), a book which 
relentlessly examines the cultural mores of French, more especially Parisian, life. Bourdieu’s 
major contributions were many: he outlined a theory of practice that clearly influenced 
Giddens as well as Schatzki; he played a major role in debates in the sociology of education 
but for Maclean and Harvey his major contribution for the study of organizations and 
management was in his analyses of elites, their power relations and how they reproduce 
their social domination. In the chapter Bourdieu’s ideas and concepts are used to illustrate 
four specific areas of research. These are class domination and its relation to cultural 
reproduction in big business; the importance of reflexivity for social mobility; how 
entrepreneurial philanthropy legitimates wealth; how distinctions, based on subtle and 
cultivated displays of taste, serve to stratify and exercise power. Bourdieu’s work makes 
available resources for analysis of the activities of elites in the global field of power as they 
enjoy their undoubted domination, sometimes subtly so, other times more overtly. 
Bourdieu was one of the earliest social theorists of practices per se, in his book, Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977). Practice became the central concept in the emerging 
critical realist view of social science, coming into sharp focus with the work of Theodore 
Schatzki, as Georg Loscher, Violetta Splitter and David Seidl discusses in the chapter on 
‘Theodor Schatzki's theory and its implications for Organization Studies’. Practice, as an 
analytical category, has a long and distinguished pedigree, going back at least to analytical 
philosophy, especially Wittgenstein’s (1968) Philosophical investigations, with its central 
focus on language games as forms of practical being in the world. The chapter introduces 
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the practice theory developed by Theodore Schatzki and highlights its implications for 
organization studies. In particular, it shows how his theory, a fecund source for the ‘practice 
turn’ in organization and management theory, contributes to an understanding of the 
micro-foundations of organizations, the embeddedness of organizations in their wider social 
context, especially that there are temporal and spatial dimensions to organizations. Schatzki 
bases his work on a critique of Bourdieu and Giddens, two prominent practice-oriented 
theorists (Schatzki, 1996) to develop a version known as Site Ontology (Schatzki, 2002) that 
offers a general theoretical apparatus for examining the relationship between human 
activity and the social. For Schatzki, there is just one level of social reality, such that no 
distinction should be made between micro and macro levels. All human activity and social 
phenomena are situated within intertwined practices and it is to the practices that 
constitute these that we should attend. 
Bourdieu, as we have seen, began his research career as an anthropologist. So too did Mary 
Douglas, another influential source of organization and management theorizing, as Dean 
Pierides and Graham Sewell elaborate in their contribution to the book, ‘Mary Douglas and 
institutions’. In their chapter, they demonstrate how those many researchers that claim an 
interest in institutions and institutional theory should read and use the work of Mary 
Douglas. Douglas, as with other social theorists we have encountered, such as Giddens and 
Archer, saw one of the central problems of social theory to be the extent to which the 
structure of institutions and organizations determines the agency afforded to individuals. 
Douglas deals with institutions in a way that is quite distinctive from the latent structural 
functionalism that characterises many institutional theories in the management and 
organization studies field. She does this by way of a framework termed Grid-and-Group, 
 18 
which allows her to develop critiques of rational agency and methodological individualism. 
Her concerns build on the anthropological tradition of Durkheim & Mauss (1963) and focus 
on the ways in which classifications are social conventions. Douglas extends their analysis of 
classifications to the modern world. What needs to be understood in any specific analysis is 
how a classificatory enterprise is matched with social requirements. In building this 
understanding, she draws on the work of the educational sociologist, Basil Bernstein, with 
his work on elaborated and restricted linguistic codes. These constitute different values, 
divisions of labour and social organization that are differently upheld depending on the 
culture that produced them as classification systems. In Douglas’ work, as they explain, this 
is developed through the concepts of ‘group’ as the experience of a bounded social unit 
whose identity is expressed through ritual. Group is independent of what Douglas calls 
‘grid’, which consists either of rules prioritizing the individual as a nodal point from which 
relations radiate or placing them within a cross-hatching of rules, distinctions and 
regulations. As they explain, this sets up three conditions: group and grid, in which 
boundaries and internal order are well established; group not grid, where boundaries are 
rigid but there is internal disarray and, grid not group, where ego-centred networks prevail. 
Students of Douglas’ were subsequently to use these distinctions to generate a complete 
theory of Organizing and disorganizing (Thompson, 2008), the implications of which have 
been largely neglected. Organizational scholars, Pierides and Sewell argue, could benefit 
greatly from exploring how Douglas’ cultural theory can be used to investigate how 
membership of social entities such as organizations involves a consideration of actions that 
are more than the enactment of schemas or logics, as organization institutionalists tend to 
argue. 
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Several scholars have focused on what they see as the key characteristics of contemporary 
times; for both Luhmann and Castells, although in different ways, it is the central issue of 
communication and its networks.  Cátia Miriam Costa, Tiago Lima Quintanilha and Sandro 
Mendonça address the work of Manuel Castells, who has written extensively about the 
‘network society’.  While Luhmann was very much a systematic and Germanic theorist of 
systems as an ontological totality Castells was both theoretically sophisticated and open to 
the empirically changing world he experienced, from the “Events of May, 1968” in Paris, a 
proto-revolutionary context harking both backwards to a fading industrial capitalism and 
forwards to a world yet to come that the students on the streets would help prepare, if not 
make, one marked by the material revolutions of the information age.  
Castells is a Catalonian, educated in France during the events of ’68, a student of Alain 
Touraine, who was a major social theorist of post-industrial society (Touraine, 1971), who 
works in the United States but plays a global intellectual and policy-related role. Castells’ 
central interest is in communication and access to information. Understanding how the 
social appropriation of information and communication technologies came to define the 
contemporary period is his central research theme. Castells’ social theory provides 
intellectual tools with which to focus on the processes of structural transformation that 
have been transformational from the late 60s to the present day. Castells key object of 
analysis is the “Network Society”(Castells, 1996; 2002; 2005; 2012).  Networks are the 
defining media of power relations and communication in contemporary times; power 
relations are also central to Castells’ (2009; see Clegg 2010) work. Networks have no centre 
but they do have nodal points and these are increasingly subject to the control on a small 
number of global multinational companies, behemoths of the contemporary scene, many of 
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them media organizations. Informationalism, the result of the complex interaction of 
technology and society that took shape from the 1970s has served these behemoths well. 
Informationalism refers to the broad template of patterns and dynamics that define the 
Information Age, the successor to the modern times of industrial capitalism. The 
augmentation of human capacities for information processing and communication made 
possible by microelectronics, computing, software, the Internet and other revolutionary 
technologies has served these businesses well. 
States are no longer the only major crucibles of power as networks become the prime locus 
for contemporary analysis of global power, laced as multiple, overlapping, open and socio-
spatially interactive systems comprising interconnected nodes. Communication flows 
through these nodes, revolutionized since the development of digital technologies, creating 
the global network society in its interactions and exchanges with, as well as its 
marginalization of, already existing societal sites, cultures, organizations and institutions of 
various types. The nodes configure power relations. Power relations have a structural 
architecture, expressed in terms of spatial and temporal orderings, focused on the 
extraction and appropriation of value conceived in terms of various logics that are 
themselves an expression of power. Behind his theorizing is an irreducible commitment to 
the value and values of life itself as the ultimate value on which any form of human 
organization should be judged.  
Castells is a major figure in global social science while Nikolas Luhmann is a major figure in 
German social science whose ideas, although influential in Scandinavia and Germany, were 
been less so elsewhere until relatively recently. He is famous for his construction of a total 
and coherent theorizing of modern society as a system built around communication 
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networks endowed with their own rules and codes, as Xavier Deroy explores in his chapter, 
‘Luhmann and Organizations as Social Systems’. The system was the major device of Talcott 
Parsons’ (2013) structural functionalism, with which Luhmann was deeply familiar but does 
not follow. For Parsons modern societies were unified and ordered by a central value 
system and commonly patterned variables that all sub-systems had to deal with as 
institutional questions. Luhmann sees disorder and differentiation as more characteristic of 
modern societies in which communication is embedded within many specific, differentiated 
and fragmented social systems, each with specific discursive codes, which makes 
coordination difficult. Communication that is framed intra-systemically in a society of many 
systems creates a fragmented society of social systems centred on their inherent practices 
but not necessarily capable of communicating easily across distinct systems. Each specific 
type of social system’s communication is structured by their respective codes, elaborated 
within the system and by reference to the system. In this context, diverse communication 
networks have no centre but systematically make up the complexity of modern societies, a 
complexity that may generate unexpected social evolutions. For instance, an event such as a 
referendum can become the occasion for unanticipated social evolutions flowing from a 
single decision point that summarily condensed all systemic complexities into a single 
binaryism: a referendum such as Brexit is an event whose binaryism has generated 
enormous amounts of uncertainty unforeseen in advance.  
Typically, it is organizations that constitute stable units in modern societies and are 
characterised by decisions, designed as communication operations that typically provide 
structures and rules communicated by organizations to their members to reduce 
unexpected decisions. However, risk is an inherent element of organization’s systemic 
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functioning, based on communication operations. It arises when events occur that cannot 
be coded on the basis of precedent and rules, thus creating situations in which the 
structures and rules communicated by organizations to their members do not reduce 
unexpected decisions. A national referendum that is not bounded within existing 
organization systems (such as political parties or other organizations) poses such an event, 
as the United Kingdom experienced in the wake of the Brexit decision, from which it 
emerged decidedly less united. From Luhmann’s perspective, risk is an inherent element of 
organizational systemic functioning based on communication operations but because 
systems have reflexive capabilities, which he calls autopoiesis, meaning that they can 
reproduce, repair and maintain their functioning, risks can be a source of learning how to 
manage better.  
Organizations reduce the risks associated with the contingency of their operations of 
communication and absorb uncertainty derived from these operations, through hierarchies, 
decision premises and membership. Hence, organizations can achieve a partial reduction of 
uncertainty but uncertainty is everlasting if only because each new decision cannot be 
guaranteed to account for its interpretation on future occasions and for future events. 
Everlasting uncertainty is irreducible. Paradoxically, organizational decisions can also 
reintroduce unexpected and worrying social evolutions. With his social systems theory, 
Luhmann provides an approach in which events and contingency are at the centre of 
modern societies based on communication.  
Luhmann, as a theorist of the system, might seem to be about as far from Foucault as one 
can possibly imagine, although in his early work, especially The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1972), Foucault proved capable of producing a complex closed system of communication. 
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Nonetheless, if not for this work, Michel Foucault is probably the most celebrated and 
famous of the social theorists discussed in this book. Foucault was a philosopher and 
historian of ideas whose empirical data were documentary materials, often archival. His 
overall concern was with different modalities of power its variation in history and in society 
as constituted by discourse and practice. Foucault distinguishes between sovereign power 
and disciplinary power. The former expresses itself through ceremony, the latter through 
routines and knowledge production that is expressed as a form of disciplinary power that 
structures the individuals’ dispositions and lifeworld. In the neoliberal age, however, it is 
knowledge about populations and human behaviours that support a specific practice of 
government that Foucault calls governmentality.  
Foucault, as with many of the social theorists discussed here, is not easily contained within 
any singular account of his work as a unity. As Alan McKinlay and Eric Pezet state in their 
chapter, ‘Organizing Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Governmentality’, there are many 
Foucault’s: in different periods in his career he focused on discourse and archaeology, 
discipline and genealogy, as well as towards the end of his life, ethics and identity. The focus 
of the chapter, however, as the title indicates, is on Foucault the theorist of power, which 
treats his ideas as they were constituted historically. The explicit concern with power in 
Foucault’s work is elaborated in Discipline and Punish (1975), a book that begins by 
juxtaposing two historical documents. It begins with a contemporary account of the 
execution of Damiens, who attempted regicide on the King of France. Robert-François 
Damiens was a domestic servant whose attempted assassination of King Louis XV in 1757 
culminated in his notorious and controversial public execution. He was the last person to 
be executed in France by drawing and quartering, a gruesome description of which forms 
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the core of he documentary account. This account is immediately followed by the rules of a 
model prison for young offenders from eighty years later that consist of a detailed 
timetabling of the offenders daily activities. As Foucault states, a public execution and a 
timetable each define a distinct penal style; each has a distinct modality of power. In the 
execution, power is wreaked on the body of the offender in a way that symbolically and 
ceremoniously represents retribution for the offence to the sovereign; in the prison, it is 
bureaucratically regulated. The execution represents ceremonial sovereign power; the 
timetable represents a productive, prosaic and everyday practice of disciplinary power.  
The chapter explores the characteristics of sovereign power through analysis of lectures 
that Foucault gave at the College de France in 1973. Sovereign power belongs to a set of 
absolutist powers embedded in a historical epoch that is now past but that does not mean 
that sovereign power died with the birth of modern republicanism and constitutional 
monarchy. It is still inscribed in those moments of high ceremony and ritual when an event 
such as an Apple product launch is orchestrated or a famous fashion designer launches their 
collection of haute couture. These are relatively special events, marked as such by ceremony 
and the positioning of the definer or CEO as sovereign over that they have displayed; 
however, while sovereign displays of power are rare and rather staged, disciplinary power is 
embedded in the routines of everyday work and life, much as the timetable. Disciplinary 
power is imbricated in the most mundane moments of everyday work and life; embedded in 
diverse forms of surveillance that make of us knowingly subjected subjects, a theme that is 
explored in the chapter through consideration of the madness of King George III and the 
subordination of sovereign power to tight management and close surveillance during his 
bouts of ill health that was embedded in a fusion of power over the patient with knowledge 
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codifying courses of treatment of the illness. The new power/knowledge became 
institutionalized in the practices of the asylum. 
These practices of the asylum, much as the practices of the prison, formed a distinct regime 
of disciplinary power/knowledge, that were themselves characteristic of many practices 
developing in distinct spheres: schools, factories, hospitals, asylums, all with their distinct 
but family-related modalities of disciplinary power/knowledge, the very model of which 
Foucault found in Bentham’s recourse to panopticism. In the modern era, however, while 
these disciplinary practices are still very evident, the modalities of power have grown to 
incorporate forms of governmentality that manage people through their freedoms, as 
McKinlay and Pezet go on to articulate. The relevancies for an understanding of 
contemporary managing and organizing should be evident.  
The relation between Foucault’s oeuvre and that of Critical Theory has been frequently 
discussed, probably most thoroughly by Mitchel Dean (1994). Critical theory emerged from 
a particular place and time in history: it was initially developed by a group of German 
intellectuals in the inter-war period amidst the collapse of the Weimar republic and the rise 
of fascism. Not all of them survived the latter, although several managed to escape the 
holocaust that was to consume so many and arrived in the United States where they 
continued their work in a very different conjuncture. As Marxist intellectuals, they were 
confronted by a Europe traumatized by what seemed to be the failure of the Marxist project 
in the Soviet Union under the tyranny of Lenin and Stalin and the rise of fascist barbarianism 
in Germany, in the United States they found a very different ‘new world’. In Europe, as 
Edward Granter notes in his chapter on ‘The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory’, they were 
confronted with what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002), a leading member of 
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the Frankfurt School, referred to as barbarism, a world scarred by unemployment, economic 
crisis, militarization and a terrorist regime; arriving in America in 1937, they arrived in a 
country that despite the depression of the earlier 1930s, appeared by contrast to be a land 
of plenty. 
In America they did not surrender their critical analysis of social order. As critical scholars 
they took nothing for granted but sought to understand forms of social ordering in terms of 
their human potential for emancipating human beings from oppression, whether material 
or cultural. Indeed, the focus on the latter came to characterize the Critical Theorists’ 
concerns, perhaps best seen in Marcuse’s (1964) One Dimensional Man, a trenchant critique 
of consumerist society and its satisfactions, that was quite influential in various student 
movements of the late 1960s. Other elements of Critical Theory have been adopted and 
adapted in organization analysis as Granter explains, often in terms of Adorno’s (1973) 
conception of negative dialectics: a commitment to not taking for granted the ways in which 
powerful interests in the world represent its nature, essence and being; the necessity of 
opposing ways of thinking in which analysis and everyday life can become trapped in the 
repletion of mundaneity without ever aspiring to transcend and improve its quality. 
One area that the Critical Theorists have been, in turn, criticized for, is their lack of attention 
to certain facts that sustained the capitalism they critiqued: 
Frankfurt School critical theory, despite its seminal insights into the relationships between 
domination, modern society, and the opportunities for redemption through art as critique, is 
stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire 
(Said, 1993, p. 278). 
Others with an interest in emancipation might have seen further areas in which blindness 
was apparent. One of these was feminism, a perspective that the relative gender blindness 
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of the student movements inspired by critical theory, did much to provoke. Other forms of 
social theory were to prove more useful in this respect.  Judith Butler’s particular interest is 
in gender classifications and an approach to them that is developed in part from Foucault, 
although she also shares a common interest with Douglas in the ways that classifications 
work. Kate Kenny, in her chapter on ‘Judith Butler and performativity’, explores her 
approach to studying identification and subjection in organizations, focusing especially on 
her theory of performativity. Butler’s work develops out of her commitments as a feminist, 
examining discourses of gender and sexuality and how these play out in social life, including 
how they interact with each other.  
In theorizing new directions for understanding identification, Butler’s work followed on 
directly from the examination of subjection to power that Foucault developed in his later 
work, The history of sexuality (Foucault, 1999).  Butler’s approach to identification and 
subjection is conceptualized in terms of affective recognition, which describes how we are 
compelled, affectively and often without our knowledge or will, into subjection to powerful 
discourses.  These ideas become particularly evident when we look at the ways in which 
gender emerges as a classificatory system of recognition; not only does such a system have 
importance for understanding socialization process (Allen, 2013) but it is also important for 
organization studies, in particular for studies of identification and subjection and the role of 
power in such processes. The subject emerges through the positions available and afforded 
in language, outside of which one cannot exist.  Those norms with which we identify compel 
us to seek recognition in their terms; to be considered as well as to consider oneself as a 
valid subject one must be legitimized by the normative identities available. Power relations 
and their manifestations as normative categories dictate how subjects may be recognized. 
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Our compulsion to be recognized can be productive in many cases and for example leads to 
the formation of solidarity groups but it can so lead to othering and exclusion of those 
constituted as others. Affective recognition, it is concluded, is ultimately ambivalent 
because the power of norms is neither determined nor monolithic but is always open to 
being subverted: the engagement of structure and agency is never ending.   
Many of the theorist that we have considered thus far focus extensively on the duality of 
agency and structure. Norbert Elias, the subject of Robert van Krieken’s chapter on ‘Norbert 
Elias and organizational analysis: towards process-figurational theory’, does not dwell on 
dualities. Elias’ approach to analysis is deeply grounded in mastery of historical materials. 
Being so embedded in historical documents, such as manuals of etiquette and manners, 
Elias can hardly fail to take a processual approach, one that van Krieken terms a ‘process-
figurational’ approach. At times, Elias’ approach might seem far from contemporary 
concerns: the history of the civilizing process, the emergences of courtly society and the 
transformation of its norms, detailed analysis of table manners and arrangements: these are 
distinctive themes seemingly far from contemporary concerns with management and 
organizations. Not so, suggests van Krieken: he has much to offer. There are links with 
Weber’s rationalization thesis (which immediately draws links to Ritzer’s (2002) 
McDonaldization thesis); the importance of self-censorship as an institutionalized mode of 
psychic control has echoes in Foucault (1975), as does his insistence on a relational 
conception of power. The concept of figuration covers similar ground to that staked out in 
actor network theory. Elias was discussing habitus before Bourdieu (1977). 
Elias’ approach is both processual, that is historical, and relational, that is focused on social 
relations rather than static entities, expressed in concepts that are invariably reifications. In 
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this respect he shares a preference with Karl Weick (1995) for verbs as gerunds rather than 
for nouns.  Focusing on the gerund form of verbs immediately orients us to social action, 
rather than to social structure; structure becomes contingent on doing rather than being. 
It’s being there is always an accomplishment constituted in action. The apparent 
independence of social order and social structure from intentional human action is an 
appearance that much relational work sustains; the task of social research is to make this 
relational work not so much apparent as transparent. In doing so the figurations that sustain 
social relations and the structures they assume and presume become the matter for 
analysis. A central figuration of modern times, of course, is the notion of the organization 
and its management and as van Krieken argues, it is through close attention to phenomena 
such as the emergence of norms of meetings, protocols, dress and control of emotionality, 
that we can bring Elias’ perspective to bear on analysis. Indeed, as he charts in the chapter, 
there are many contributions that have made major contributions using Elias as a resource, 
although they seem not to have been incorporated into mainstream theorizing. 
Norbert Elias shared some characteristics with another of our cast of characters: he was an 
involuntary outsider who adopted another country for his professional life. Elias, of Jewish 
descent, was born in Bresslau in Germany in 1897. In the 1930s he was working under Karl 
Mannheim at the Institute of Sociology in the University of Frankfurt, which was closed 
down by the fascists in 1933. Sensing the future of things to come, Elias fled, initially to 
Paris, eventually to England, where he reconnected with Manheim, to work with him at the 
London School of Economics before being interred as an enemy alien during part of the war. 
Later, he was to join the University of Leicester Sociology Department, in 1957, where he 
stayed until his retirement.  It was only several years after his retirement that he became 
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well known outside of Leicester, when his study of The Civilizing Process (Elias, 1969) was 
published. It was a career whose trajectory one would be unlikely to find in these days. 
The other involuntary outsider was Zygmunt Bauman, a Polish émigré sociologist who spent 
most of his career in England, working at the University of Leeds in Yorkshire. He left not 
because of the Nazis but as a result of a political purge by the Communist authorities in his 
native Poland in 1968. Initially he went to live in Israel but after three years moved to 
England. His output of books was prodigious and in his later years they focused on the issue 
of what he termed ‘liquid modernity’. For Bauman, the world of organizations was becoming 
ever more liquid, dissolving old structures, certainties and relations. Stewart Clegg and 
Miguel Pina e Cunha explore the contours of these liquid changes and their import for 
organization analysis in their chapter on ‘Liquefying modernity: Zygmunt Bauman as 
organization theorist’, by discussing liquid selves, liquid organizations and liquid aesthetics, 
as three facets of Bauman’s work with implications for organizations and management.   
Applying the metaphor of liquid to organizations highlights practices in which investments in 
people are highly liquid and easily liquidated, with no long-term investment implications.  As 
the chapter explores, there are ethical, political, identity, and organizational consequences 
of increasing liquidity. Ethically, modern leaders are seen to be forever reassembling the 
pieces of their own identity as the liquid state changes. Politically, power relations become 
marked by a new lightness of synoptical power relations (Mathieson, 1997 for the original 
reference; also see Lancione and Clegg 2014) augmenting and supplementing more 
traditional panoptical power as we encounter it in Foucault’s disciplinary power. In terms of 
identity, liquidity is marked by the immediateness of the self in the moment. 
Organizationally, liquidity predisposes its leaders to improvisation over heavy scripting as 
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role prescriptions become more fluid and uncertain and events less predictable. The focus 
of the chapter is on how liquid modernity frames contemporary leadership. Managerial 
expertise in ‘leadership’ is increasingly seen as a practice of shared, dispersed and mutually 
constituted influence gained in successful steering of projects despite the irreducible 
contingency of unforeseen events. Rather as Luhmann sees the modern world as composed 
of systems of communication that are specific and differentiated Bauman is equally 
sceptical about the capacity of any central control to steer events. Deregulation, 
individualization, weakened human bonds, increased fluidity of solidarities and the drift 
from normative regulation through common patterns of socialization to processes that are 
much more individuated are all key features of the liquid condition identified by Bauman. As 
such, as the chapter concludes, they leave social ordering increasingly at risk from the sirens 
of authoritarian populism. Populism, of course, in not the only risk of contemporary times: 
to populism one must add climate catastrophe as a phenomenon that social theory can 
address to inform management and organization studies.   
Conclusion 
None of the social theorist surveyed here would regard managing and organizing, 
management and organizations, as a self-contained space of explanation that needed no 
reference to larger social forces and their theorization. Instead, in their different ways, they 
saw the field as a terrain in which rival social theories produced coherent, if diverse, insights 
into these wider social forces and their effects  
The world is increasingly global as a result of digital affordances yet major business 
organizations are increasingly centralized as a result of the monopolizing tendencies 
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inherent in command of these affordances. Patterns of everyday life, commerce and 
administration are, in Bauman’s terms, increasingly liquid for the many but they are also 
solidifying wealth and privilege for the few. In a world in which old certainties are dissolving 
as fast as new opportunities emerge it is no longer the case that any organization provides 
boundaries strong enough to keep the uncertainties at bay nor has managers wise enough 
to understand the framing, transcending and upsetting of assumptions of what is normal. In 
such times the questioning that various social theories offer becomes ever more relevant to 
how we understand and live our lives, how those lives are constituted by power relations 
that legitimate, certain ideologies, norms, values, roles, rules, identities, beliefs, discourses, 
symbols, meaning-systems and systems of domination. Organizing and managing is rooted 
in the assumptions of everyday life that these power relations sustain. They are the matrix 
of normalcy, a matrix that cannot be understood through just those terms that the matrix 
manufactures, sustains, and reproduces. Social theories enable us to understand that the 
ideational citadels of knowledge need to be open to disruption just as much as are those 
material phenomena upon which they speculate. Social theories provide devices for 
disruption of extremely consequential discourses, such as management and organization 
theory: in the concluding chapter we invite you to explore these theories by posing an index 
of possibilities for future work informed by the social theories whose exploration awaits 
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